Labor Statistics Measurement Issues by Robert Topel
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Labor Statistics Measurement Issues
Volume Author/Editor: John Haltiwanger, Marilyn E. Manser and Robert
Topel, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-31458-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/halt98-1
Publication Date: January 1998
Chapter Title: Analytical Needs and Empirical Knowledge in Labor Economics
Chapter Author: Robert Topel
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8357
Chapter pages in book: (p. 51 - 74)2  Analytical Needs and Empirical 
Knowledge in Labor Economics 
Robert Topel 
I was grateful to be able to answer promptly and I did 
I said I didn’t know. 
-Mark  Twain 
That would be a large mistake, even for an economist. 
-An  astrophysicist, commenting on a gross miscalculation 
of the location of a galaxy 
What types of new data would further our understanding of how labor markets 
work? My unenviable task is to summarize important analytical issues in em- 
pirical labor economics, and how these issues might be resolved through the 
collection of better data. This is no small assignment since it requires a parallel 
assessment of the state of empirical knowledge-what  we know and what we 
should know-in  the study of income and wealth. This evaluation is bound to 
be subjective, which may itself be a comment on our current state of knowl- 
edge. The type of data that I think should be collected and analyzed depends 
naturally on what I think it is important to learn about. 
The paradigm for my  discussion divides empirical research in labor eco- 
nomics into two useful functions. The first is descriptive. Perhaps more than 
any other scholars, labor economists are walking arsenals of facts. How has 
wage inequality changed over the past 25 years? How much more do Ameri- 
cans work than Germans? How much more do college graduates earn than high 
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school graduates, and how has that premium changed over time? Which worker 
types earn more than others? How many times does the typical worker change 
jobs in his or her career, and when do those changes occur? To answer these 
questions, labor economists describe a particular market equilibrium or com- 
pare equilibrium outcomes over time or space. 
For this descriptive function the main data issue is one of detail. How can 
we get more, and more detailed and accurate, data that allow us to describe the 
labor market and employment relationships? 
The second function, which is at least as important and involves substan- 
tially more economics, is to estimate the comparative statics of economic mod- 
els that apply to the labor market. How does immigration affect the wages of 
native workers? Do declining wages cause unemployment rates to rise? How 
would a particular policy intervention (mandated employment benefits, payroll 
taxes, transfer programs, etc.) affect behavior? Does pay-for-performance im- 
prove productivity? For questions like these, the key data requirement is rarely 
one of detail. Instead, these issues require sources of  variation in real-world 
data and constraints that are capable of identifying behavioral parameters. 
My view is that empirical research on labor markets has been remarkably 
successful in  the  first, descriptive function. Microdata on  individuals and 
households, which became widely available in the  1970s, have  greatly ad- 
vanced our stock of knowledge about basic empirical facts. There is much left 
to be learned, but at least the types of data that could be collected are well 
defined. And, if more data were collected, we can be confident that important 
factual questions about labor markets and the determinants of income would 
be answered. In turn, these facts will influence research by  labor and other 
economists-they  constrain theories to be within the bounds of what we know 
to be true or relevant-just  as our past accumulation of empirical knowledge 
has done. And more constraints put on economic theorists would surely be 
good. 
Much less can be said for our knowledge of the behavioral parameters of 
economic models. The same mass quantities of  microdata, which have been 
analyzed by every labor economist, have not led to consensus on behavioral 
responses. What are the elasticities of labor supply and demand? The range of 
credible estimates of these most basic parameters is, as one survey of the labor 
supply literature put it, “dauntingly large.” Years of quantitative research have 
not done much to narrow our (or at least my) confidence bounds on these ef- 
fects. This is regrettable because knowledge of behavioral parameters is the 
foundation of policy evaluation, about which we should have something  to say. 
In this area, perhaps labor (and other) economists should be more willing to 
follow Twain’s example of modesty. 
Why the dichotomy between our knowledge of facts and our ability to mea- 
sure economic behavior? I think there are two reasons. One is that much de- 
scriptive research is model free. It describes what is, not why. It is one thing to 
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ates both increased in the 1980s. It is harder to show that one caused the other. 
Not all descriptive research is model free, however. I would categorize the ever 
growing literature on estimating the “true” returns to schooling as descriptive. 
Yet  this literature seeks to identify a particular parameter, with many of  the 
same identification issues that arise in estimating behavioral models. 
The second reason is the nature of  the data that labor economists analyze. 
Household data constructed to study income and wealth, like the census, the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), and the Panel Study of  Income Dynamics 
(PSID), are meant to be descriptive. They are not experimental. Behavioral 
effects can only be teased out of  such data through identifying assumptions 
that are typically open to dispute. “Natural experiments,” which seek arguably 
exogenous variations in incentives in nonexperimental data, are just another 
name for credible identifying assumptions. Absent true experimental data- 
which are only rarely available, and even then only for the narrowest of prob- 
lems-this  state of affairs will continue. There are no easy solutions, so prog- 
ress will remain slow. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes a role for descrip- 
tive empirical research, outlines some successes, and discusses some areas 
where I believe that better data would have high marginal value. I do not pro- 
pose any general strategy for collecting new data, or new types of data. I follow 
in section 2.2 with a largely pessimistic review of what we know about magni- 
tudes of behavioral responses in economic models of the labor market, and the 
prospects for improving the situation with better data. I  offer no solutions. 
Section 2.3 concludes the paper. 
2.1  Describing Labor Markets 
The growth of empirical labor economics as a field of  research coincides 
with the availability of detailed microdata on firms and especially households. 
Labor economists today are vastly better informed about the details of relative 
wages, unemployment rates, and labor force composition than 25 years ago. 
The wealth of  our knowledge, and our continuing efforts to document more 
facts, is not always counted as a blessing. One of my colleagues, an interna- 
tional economist, disparagingly refers to labor economists as “accountants.” 
Another laments that there is too little economics in recent empirical research. 
Yet  the international economist studies the effects of  international trade on 
wage inequality. His own research agenda would be entirely different had labor 
economists not documented the unprecedented increase in inequality that oc- 
curred over the past two decades and postulated that it might have to do with 
trade (Murphy and Welch 1992; Johnson and Stafford 1993; Borjas, Freeman, 
and Katz 1992). 
This effect is one of the main roles of descriptive economic research. Eco- 
nomic problems are inherently empirical, seeking to explain or predict real- 
world outcomes and behaviors. Descriptive research then affects theory in two 54  Robert Topel 
useful ways. First, theories are developed in order to explain prominent facts 
that arise from data. The observation that wages rise with experience and job 
tenure, but at decreasing rates, spawned theories of life cycle human capital 
investment and the distinction between general and specific training (e.g., Ben- 
Porath 1967), as well as competing models based on search and matching (Jo- 
vanovic 1979a, 1979b) and incentives (Lazear 1995). 
Second, the “facts” act as a constraint on the class of  admissible theories. 
The observation that real wages are procyclical caused an early rejection of 
Keynes’s original formulation, which predicted a countercyclical wage. The 
fact that displaced workers suffer substantial and persistent reductions in earn- 
ing power (e.g., Jacobsen, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993) gives credence to 
models that emphasize the importance of  specific human capital in employ- 
ment relationships. Models in which human capital is general are not up to the 
task. Similarly, the robustness of  estimated returns to schooling means that 
signaling theories of the demand for education are no longer given much cre- 
dence. 
This role for descriptive research helps to define the areas where collection 
of more, or more detailed, data would have the greatest returns. In what areas 
of labor market analysis is theory constrained  the least by hard empirical facts? 
Anyone’s list of areas where more or better data would be beneficial is long; I 
will emphasize four that stand out in my  own thinking: (i) the economics of 
personnel and internal labor markets, (ii) the determinants  of wage and income 
inequality, (iii) the activities of low-income individuals, and (iv) the operation 
of labor markets in developing economies. 
2.1.1  Internal Labor Markets 
The typical male worker in the U.S. labor market is now employed in a job 
that will last 18 years (Akerlof and Main 1980). This means that the wages, 
incomes, and hours of work we observe in survey data are mainly the outcomes 
of continuing trade between a single employee and a single employer. We know 
that these durable employment relations evolve from rapid turnover at the be- 
ginning of  careers, accompanied by  substantial wage gains at job transitions 
(Topel and Ward  1992). We also know that the termination of long-term em- 
ployment relations typically causes large and persistent reductions in earning 
power (Jacobson et al. 1993). But we know very little about what happens 
in between. 
This ignorance is a boon to theory. Almost all of the literature on compensa- 
tion, advancement, and incentives in organizations is based on anecdotal or 
impressionistic evidence, or just introspection. Examples from universities 
loom large. The facts impose few constraints, so theories are built with little 
notion of which factors are important in real-world employment relations and 
which are not. Among the things worth knowing are the following: 
1. What is the relationship between total compensation and wages for work- 
ers at different skill levels? Aggregate evidence suggests that much of  the 55  Analytical Needs and Empirical Knowledge in Labor Economics 
slowdown in aggregate real wage growth during the  1970s and 1980s can be 
attributed to the growing value of nonwage benefits (Council of Economic Ad- 
visers 1987). Collection of detailed data from$ms on what they pay, and the 
value of benefits they offer, would give us a more detailed picture of the distri- 
bution of well-being. It is likely that the distribution of compensation has be- 
come even more unequal than the distribution of income, but we will not know 
until the data are collected. 
2.  How do careers develop? Do movements of employees among tasks and 
levels of firms mirror patterns of  mobility between firms? How does within- 
firm mobility contribute to wage growth? Do raises mainly occur at times of 
promotion  (McCue 1996), or is there substantial growth among workers who 
remain at a single task? Does within-cohort wage inequality increase, as most 
theories of learning about talent would imply? 
3. Who leaves an organization? Is it the stars, who have risen rapidly, or the 
poorer performers who may be poorly matched? 
4. How is performance evaluated and rewarded? How does evaluated per- 
formance vary over a career? 
5. Do compensation policies emphasize equity relative to measured perfor- 
mance? To what extent are wages tied to jobs, or tasks, rather than to individu- 
als? Under what circumstances is pay more likely to be individual based, as 
opposed to job based? 
What kinds of data would allow us to answer these questions? Most large 
organizations that I have encountered maintain detailed personnel histories in 
computer databases. Analyzing a single company is a research project in itself 
(for initial attempts, see Lazear  1995; Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom  1994). 
This means that truly generalizable results will be slow in coming.  But we 
know so little now that any information on what goes on inside the “black box” 
of employment relationships would be useful. It is noteworthy  that in other 
countries-such  as  Korea,  Japan,  and  France-detailed  data  are collected 
from firms on the compensation and characteristics of individual employees. 
Similar data for the United States would be a major step forward.’ 
2.1.2  Determinants of Wage Inequality 
Why do some workers earn more than others? Information on personal char- 
acteristics in the typical survey file-like  the CPS or PSID-does  not go much 
beyond a respondent’s age and years of schooling. These observable dimen- 
sions of human capital explain about 30 percent of the variance in wages. The 
rest is open to theorizing. For example, the fact that some industries or firms 
pay more than others (Brown and Medoff  1989; Krueger and Summers 1987) 
is interpreted by some as evidence of economic rents (for a summary, see Katz 
1986) and by  others as evidence of selection on talents that are unobserved by 
I. Abowd and Kramarz (1994) analyze the French data, which are longitudinal and cover most 
of the workforce. 56  Robert Topel 
econometricians (Murphy and Topel 1987). Similarly, race and gender differ- 
ences in wages may reflect market discrimination or premarket differences in 
unobserved human capital. 
Collection of more detailed information on personal characteristics could 
go some distance toward resolving these puzzles. What types of  schools did 
people attend? What did they study, and how well did they do? An unresolved 
issue is the role of  standardized tests in measuring the talents that are valued 
in the market. Johnson and Neal (1996), using the National Longitudinal Sur- 
vey (NLS) youth cohort, find that performance on the Armed Forces Qualify- 
ing Test (AFQT), taken in high school, helps to predict subsequent earnings. 
A  1-standard-deviation increase in AFQT performance raises earnings by 
about 20 percent. They find that wage differences between young blacks and 
whites are greatly reduced when AFQT scores are controlled for. These results 
suggest that market discrimination may be less important than differences in 
premarket opportunities in determining earnings. More important, they point 
to an important role for basic premarket skills in affecting earnings. These 
skills are unmeasured in most sources of survey data. 
How important are these skills in affecting inequality? Many have hypothe- 
sized that increased income inequality in the United States is driven by  an 
increased price of unobserved skills. Murnane, Levy, and Willet (1995) provide 
some direct evidence, using cognitive test scores from the National Longitudi- 
nal Study of the Class of 1972 data and High School and Beyond. Their results 
show strong effects of mathematics scores on earnings at age 24, even control- 
ling for years of completed schooling. As important, this effect was stronger 
in 1986, when the price of skill is expected to be higher, than it was in 1978. 
These results indicate a strong role for skills in determining income differ- 
ences. But test scores are surely poor proxies for the array of talents that are 
valued in labor markets. (The mathematics test measures only concepts taught 
before eighth grade.) Other tests, or collection of  more detailed data on the 
skills of individual workers, may get us closer to understanding the important 
determinants of income differentials. 
The early literature on income mobility-the  movement of individuals be- 
tween portions of the wage distribution over time-drew  a distinction between 
inequality of income and inequality of  lifetime wealth or utility (Lillard and 
Willis 1978). If poverty is a transitory state, then it is arguably less womsome 
as a social problem. This issue has taken on  added import with the steady 
increase in income inequality over the past 25 years, which most economists 
believe is driven by a change in the “price” of skill. In this context, the question 
of income mobility can be phrased in different ways. First, is rising inequality 
simply a spread in the distribution of pay across a relatively fixed distribution 
of  skill? That is, are those who are at the bottom of the wage distribution in 
1994 the same people who would have been at the bottom in 1974? Or has the 
increase in inequality been partially caused by  the movement of people from 
the middle of the income distribution toward the bottom? This type of “mobil- 57  Analytical Needs and Empirical Knowledge in Labor Economics 
ity” suggests that previously valuable human capital has become obsolete, as 
seems to occur when workers are displaced from long-term employment rela- 
tionships. 
The second question is: Once people reach the bottom of the wage distribu- 
tion, what are their prospects for recovery? If human capital is firm or industry 
specific, then movements down in the distribution are likely to reflect the obso- 
lescence just mentioned. Then mobility is a one-way street and recovery is 
unlikely, especially for experienced workers who have  lost their previously 
valuable skills. Poverty is more of  an absorbing state in this case, with large 
effects on lifetime wealth. 
These issues have  hardly been  addressed in the burgeoning literature on 
wage inequality. (See Gottschalk and Moffitt  1994 for an exception. Topel 
1993 contains preliminary calculations.) In part this is because the two main 
sources of  panel data, the PSID and the NLS, are fairly small, so that move- 
ments between portions of the wage distribution are difficult to gauge accu- 
rately. The only solution is to obtain larger longitudinal data sets. For example, 
in Sweden it is possible to obtain longitudinal data on tax returnsfor the entire 
population. That is a data set up to the task of  measuring income mobility. 
Concerns about confidentiality are greater in the United States, so the likeli- 
hood of obtaining such data is small. An alternative that could go some of the 
way  there would be to match individuals  (not households) from one census 
year to another, or at least to ask about earnings histories in standard cross- 
sectional surveys. Data like the Displaced Workers Supplements of the January 
CPS have  proved useful in this regard, but they are limited to workers who 
have lost a job in a five-year window. 
2.1.3  Activities of Low-Income Individuals 
The low-income “underclass” is one of the most serious social problems of 
our day. Reported incomes of persons at the bottom of the U.S. income distri- 
bution are grindingly low, having fallen by  nearly a third since the early 1970s 
(Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce  1993). Aggregate statistics tell us that declining 
earning power is associated with rising rates of labor force withdrawal among 
prime-aged men (Juhn, Murphy, and Topel 1991; Juhn 1992). How do these 
people survive? Do they rely on families and friends, or are there other sources 
of  income that are not reported in survey data? What role is played by  the 
underground economy? 
These questions are important if we are to understand the causes and conse- 
quences of poverty, and the workings of low-wage labor markets generally. Yet 
economists rarely touch these issues. Sociologists have played a much more 
active role (e.g., Wilson 1987) by collecting their own data instead of relying 
on government sources alone. Recent efforts to interview individuals in inner 
city labor markets, part of the NBER’s project on unemployment, are a step in 
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2.1.4  Labor Markets in Developing Countries 
The recent resurgence of interest by macroeconomists in economic growth 
has emphasized the role of human capital as an “engine” of growth (e.g., Lucas 
1988). At a descriptive empirical level, the growth accounting exercises of 
Young (1992, 1994)  have stressed the contribution  of human capital accumula- 
tion to the growth “miracles” of Korea, Singapore,  Taiwan, and Hong Kong. In 
these countries, the labor force has been transformed-over  a relatively brief 
period-from  a predominantly rural, unskilled, and agricultural base to being 
relatively skilled, urban, and industrial. In these countries, productivity and 
real wages more than tripled in the space of two decades. 
What is the role of  the labor market in the development process? What 
forces drive the industrial migration of  labor? Does industrial expansion re- 
quire rising educational attainment? Do changing factor proportions, caused 
by rising average schooling levels, change relative wages? These are basic and 
answerable questions about what happens during the growth process. Aside 
from a few country-specific studies, however, little is known about their an- 
swers. 
What kinds of data would help? Collecting new data would help us to under- 
stand the role of the labor market during future episodes of growth, and so one 
might wish that governments or international agencies collected data on the 
model of the American CPS. Many governments do, but there is no centralized 
agency-say,  the World Bank-that  serves as a repository for the data. Per- 
haps greater progress could be made if  existing data were made available to 
economic researchers. In Japan and Korea, for example, ministries of  labor 
collect detailed individual data on random samples of employees for all firms 
with more than 10 workers. While tabulations of these data are published, the 
raw  data-which  exist in tape form-are  generally not available to outside 
users. Much can be learned from these data, but they have to be pried from the 
fingers of bureaucracies. 
2.2  Parametric Models: Gauging Behavioral Responses 
Most of economics is about incentives and behavioral responses to varying 
constraints. One of  the main functions of  an empirical economist is to be 
knowledgeable about these responses, which may range from simple suppiy 
and demand elasticities to the parameters of value functions in models of dy- 
namic optimization. Yet in spite of the increased sophistication  of econometric 
methods, we remain largely ignorant about the magnitudes of even the simplest 
behavioral responses, such as the elasticities of labor demand and supply for 
particular types of workers. Our knowledge of  other behavioral responses- 
such as how changes in a firm’s compensation  policy affect the effort and per- 
formance of  employees, or how rising educational wage premiums affect in- 
vestment in human capital-is  weaker still. 59  Analytical Needs and Empirical Knowledge in Labor Economics 
Supply and demand responses remain at the center of current debate in labor 
economics, and they are essential for even the most simple problems of policy 
evaluation. Consider the following issues that have attracted  substantial re- 
search and policy attention but remain unresolved. 
Immigration and wages. How does an increase in immigration, particularly the 
immigration of less skilled workers, affect the wages and welfare of natives? 
A number of papers have found small or negligible effects (Borjas 1987; La- 
Londe and Topel  1991; Altonji and Card 1991; Card 1990; Hunt 1992). The 
magnitude of these effects depends inversely on demand elasticities. In spite 
of negative results from previous research,  many economists are convinced 
that substantial effects are being missed. More recent evidence suggests that 
the effects of immigration of  less skilled Hispanics and Asians to California 
may have substantially reduced the wages of less skilled natives. Wage inequal- 
ity increased more in California than in any other region of the country (To- 
pel 1994). 
Welfare states and income transfers. In many contexts, the distortionary effects 
of  income  transfer  programs  depend  on  elasticities  of  labor  supply. The 
NBER’s recent project on Sweden sought to evaluate many of these effects in 
the context of the world’s most aggressive welfare state (Freeman, Topel, and 
Swedenborg 1997). Has the growth of the public sector affected women’s em- 
ployment? How distortionary is state-provided child care? Have policies that 
compress the Swedish wage distribution affected incentives to invest in educa- 
tion and human capital? All of these questions depend on supply elasticities, 
about which there is substantial uncertainty (Aronsson and Walker 1997). Pro- 
ponents of  redistribution policies will argue that the effects are small, while 
opponents predictably argue that they are large (Lindbeck  1993; Lindbeck et 
al. 1994). 
Education and relative wages. Changes in the educational composition of the 
workforce shift factor ratios, which change relative wages in inverse proportion 
to demand  elasticities  and  elasticities  of  substitution  (e.g.,  Freeman  1976; 
Welch 1979). The general pattern of these effects has been confirmed in the 
United States (Murphy and Katz 19921, Sweden (Edin and Holmlund  1995), 
Korea (Kim and Topel 19951, and Taiwan (Lu 1993). Magnitudes are not con- 
sistent across countries, however. For example, growth in the supply of more 
educated labor was accompanied by  a greater reduction in the college wage 
premium in Sweden than in the United States. Is the elasticity of substitution 
smaller in Sweden, or were factors other than relative supply acting to narrow 
the Swedish wage distribution? 
Cyclical Juctuations  in employment. Much of  what is done in economics is a 
result of our ignorance about behavioral parameters. Nowhere is this more ap- 60  Robert Tope1 
parent than in macroeconomics, where the labor market plays a central role. 
Since Keynes, the welfare implications of economic fluctuations have been a 
central issue in traditional macroeconomics. Keynesians and neo-Keynesians 
typically treat economic fluctuations as market failures in which labor markets 
fail to clear. Activist government policies can then be welfare improving. In 
contrast, “real business cycle” (RBC) models treat economic fluctuations as 
efficient responses to real shocks. Labor and other markets operate smoothly, 
and all gains from trade are realized. As one RBC  proponent characterized 
cyclical contractions: “You don’t have to be out of  equilibrium to suffer.” 
At its core, the Keynesian-RBC debate is founded on divergent views about 
the validity of the intertemporal substitution  hypothesis (ISH) in labor supply. 
If  intertemporal substitution of  work effort is “small,” then it is difficult to 
reconcile the magnitudes of  economic fluctuations in employment with the 
observed behavior of  wages and productivity. Labor supply is insufficiently 
elastic to reconcile large fluctuations in employment with relatively small 
changes in wages. In contrast, if intertemporal  substitution  is “large,” then con- 
tractions of employment and hours might be market-clearing responses to real 
productivity shocks. The remarkable state of our empirical knowledge is that 
these opposing views can coexist, and not just for a short while. In spite of 
empirical research carried out over a period of decades, most economists re- 
main unconvinced by empirical research on the ISH. It is fair to say that many 
give greater weight to their own priors about the intertemporal elasticity of 
labor supply, and perhaps properly  SO.^ A final issue serves as a useful example 
to frame the remaining discussion. 
2.2.1 
Recent proposals to extend health insurance coverage to the uninsured relied 
heavily on “employer mandates.” Under these proposals, employers that do not 
now provide health insurance coverage for their workers would be required to 
do so. Most economists would recognize that mandated benefits act as an im- 
plicit tax on employment that will distort hiring and labor supply decisions. If 
we concentrate on the market for a particular labor type that does not now 
receive employer-provided benefits-so  benefits have less private value than 
wages, at the margin-the  distortionary effects of the tax are proportional to 
the induced reduction in employment. This reduction is given by 
An Example: Policy Evaluation and Employer Mandates 
2. For reviews of the empirical literature, see Pencavel  (1986) and MaCurdy (1985). Pencavel 
suggests that  further  research  on  the  topic  “should not  proceed without  some assessment of 
whether this extraordinary effort and expense will yield sufficiently high returns.” Mulligan (1995) 
offers evidence from a variety of sources that  supports the ISH.  His evidence suggests that  an 
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In equation (l),  ED  and E, are the elasticities of demand and supply for the type 
of  labor in question, and TIW  is the implicit tax as a proportion of the wage.3 
Either explicitly or  implicitly, equation (1) was at the center of  policy de- 
bates over the effects of employer mandates. Policymakers were interested in 
how  many  “jobs” would be lost, and the expertise of  labor economists was 
sought. Supporters of mandates looked for economists who could attest that 
one or the other of  the elasticities in equation (1) is small (zero would do 
nicely). Opponents sought the opposite view.  It should come as no surprise 
that both opinions were in ample supply. Reputable economists could cite re- 
search that would support either small or  large effects of this particular policy 
because the economics profession has achieved no consensus on the parame- 
ters of equation (1). What is the state of knowledge about these parameters? 
2.2.2  Supply Elasticities 
Consider the elasticity of labor supply. No other parameter in all of econom- 
ics has attracted more research time and money than this one. Potential distor- 
tions in equation (1) would be most relevant in markets for less skilled workers, 
who currently have the lowest health insurance coverage. What value might we 
assign to E, for these workers? The most widely cited survey articles on labor 
supply, by Pencavel (1986) and Heckman and Killingsworth (1986), make no 
mention of how responses might vary across skill groups. Even so, they pro- 
vide the most exhaustive reviews of the profession’s state of knowledge about 
labor supply responses. 
For women, Heckman and Killingsworth note that most studies find large 
and positive labor supply responses, yet “the range of estimates of the uncom- 
pensated elasticity of annual hours is dauntingly large.”4  The studies they re- 
view  report uncompensated supply elasticities ranging from  -0.30  up  to 
+  14.0.  What they call a “reasonable guesstimate” of the elasticity of women’s 
labor supply is probably positive, but it has a huge standard error (much larger 
than reported in any of the cited papers). A value of E, = 0.5 might be reason- 
able (e.g., Hausman 1981), but elasticities well above 2.0 (e.g., Heckman 1976, 
1980) are just as likeiy on the basis of current evidence. If we  wish to apply 
equation (1) to women, then, our “guesstimate” might be off by a factor of 5 
or more.5 
Econometric estimates of  labor supply elasticities for men have  a much 
smaller range. At the end of an extraordinarily careful review of the literature 
on male labor supply, Pencavel (1986) concludes that “the vast proportion of 
3. If m < 1  is the value of  $1 in insurance benefits to workers, then T = 1 -  m. Then equation 
(1) says that there is no distortion if workers are indifferent between mandated benefits and wages. 
4. The uncompensated elasticity is appropriate here because real incomes are not held constant 
for the group in question. 
5. Rosen (1997) applies a value of E, = 2.0 in his welfare calculations for Sweden, yielding 
large distortions from child care subsidies. 62  Robert Tope1 
[empirical work on men’s labor supply]-both  that based on the static model 
and that based on the life-cycle model-indicates  that the elasticities of hours 
of work with respect to wages are very small. In other words, the focus of most 
economists’ research has been on behavioral responses that for men appear to 
be of a relatively small order of magnitude.” Indeed, in Pencavel’s review, 19 
of 22 reported estimates of the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply from 
nonexperimental data are negative, while the largest estimate from eight stud- 
ies based on negative income tax experiments is 0.2. The average estimated 
elasticity over all cited studies is -0.08.  If we take this as a “consensus” esti- 
mate of the elasticity of male labor supply, the evidence is that time worked is 
completely unresponsive to changes in wages. For men, the existing literature 
suggests that the employment change in equation (1) is likely to be negligible. 
I do not think there is consensus, however. Economists’ objections to the 
canonical model of labor supply, applied to cross-sectional  data, are numerous 
and well known. (Most workers are engaged in long-term employment rela- 
tionships, where the current wage is not a summary statistic for the terms of 
trade. Wages are measured with substantial error in the microdata sets used to 
estimate labor supply, and valid instrumental variables are hard to come by. 
And so on.) In contrast to the evidence produced by the labor supply literature, 
my guess is that most economists believe that the true elasticity of male labor 
supply is positive, at least among men who earn low wages. That is, most 
economists think that the policies underlying equation (1) will have some dis- 
tortionary effect. 
In support of  this view, figure 2.1  shows the relationship between weeks 
worked per year and hourly wages of prime-aged men for the 20-year period 
1970-89. The data are from the March CPS, as described in Juhn et al. (1991). 
The figure shows that those who earn more typically work more too. In fact, 
the curve looks suspiciously like the labor supply curves we are accustomed 
to drawing in class. Of course, the displayed relationship between wages and 
weeks worked does not mean that a reduction in the wages of low-wage work- 
ers would cause them to work less. In fact, the “consensus” estimates from the 
male labor supply literature predict that their hours would remain roughly un- 
changed. 
An experiment of this type has occurred in the United States during the past 
25 years. Widening inequality has reduced the real wages of  workers at the 
bottom of  the wage distribution by  as much as 30 percent since 1970. This 
widely documented change in real wages is surely demand driven (Katz and 
Murphy 1992;  Bound and Johnson 1992),  which allows us to test the prediction 
that working time will not fall with wages. Figure 2.2 compares the distribu- 
tions of changes in real wages and changes in annual time worked across dec- 
iles of the wage distribution, based on calculations in Juhn et al. (1991). The 
figure demonstrates that both dimensions of nonwork-nonparticipation  and 
unemployment-increased  over this period. More important, declining em- TI  I  I  I  I 
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Figure 2.1 
aged men, 1970-89 
Source: Calculated from March Current Population Survey files, 1968-90.  See Juhn, Murphy, and 
Topel (1991) for a description of  the data. 
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Table 2.1  Elasticities  of Labor Supply and Changes in Weeks Worked across 
Percentiles of Wage Distribution 
Percentiles of Wage Distribution 
1-10  11-20  21-40  41-60  61-100 
Elasticity of  supply 
From figure 2.1  .42  .29  .21  .I5  .07 
From regional variationa  .49  .3  1  .17  .07  .08 
(4.31)  (4.53)  (3.56)  (1.60)  (2.02) 
Actual  4.83  2.54  1.66  .41  .I0 
Predicted from supply elasticity  4.58  2.96  1.71  .78  .05 
Change in weeks worked, 1972-89 
Nore: See text and figure 2.1. 
aNumbers  in parentheses are ?-ratios. 
ployment was concentrated  among workers whose earning power was also fall- 
ing. Among workers above the median of the wage distribution there was no 
change in labor supply behavior. 
These calculations suggest that labor supply did respond to changes in 
wages over this period. To test this idea, we used regional data on wages and 
employment rates to estimate 
ei, = A,,  +  + qy, + E,, . 
In equation (2),  ei, is the employment rate of  workers from interval i of  the 
wage distribution in region r and year t,  and win  is the average log wage for 
that group. Estimated uncompensated “labor supply elasticities” from equation 
(2) are shown in table 2.1. I also show the elasticities implied for each interval 
from the curve in figure 2.1. The correspondence is fairly remarkable: actual 
changes in working time, generated by  time-series changes within regional 
labor markets, are not much different from what the cross-sectional relation- 
ship of wages to work would imply. These estimates also do well in predicting 
the distribution of changes in labor supply across intervals of the wage distri- 
bution, as shown at the bottom of table 2.1. 
The “labor supply elasticities” shown in table 2.1 are far above the consen- 
sus estimates one might draw from the existing literature. For the workers at 
the bottom of  the distribution our  estimates imply an elasticity of  weeks 
worked with respect to wages in excess of 0.40. It is worth noting that much 
of this effect is driven by labor force withdrawals among unskilled men, whose 
wages fell. This margin is often ignored in male labor supply studies, but it is 
surely relevant for our example, or any other welfare calculation. 
Does this evidence mean that male labor supply really  is responsive to 
changes in wages? Perhaps not. Perhaps other factors also changed over this 
period, and they coincidentally  caused men with declining wages to work less. 
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is surely  appealing as identifying leverage for estimating labor supply re- 
sponses. At the least, this evidence makes me unsure of any prediction based 
on small estimated elasticities of  supply, especially as it may  apply to low- 
wage markets. 
Labor supply responses play a central role in policy evaluation, yet  labor 
supply studies seem to have gone out of vogue in empirical labor economics. 
Most studies that underlie our working knowledge of labor supply are based 
on a small number of data sets that were collected in the 1960s  and early 1970s. 
Labor markets have changed dramatically since then, and most would argue 
that changing relative demands for different worker types have been the major 
driving force. These forces provide a potentially useful environment in which 
to study labor supply. Given the importance of these issues, and the weak state 
of our current knowledge, I believe that a reassessment is warranted. 
2.2.3  Demand Elasticities 
The best source of  evidence on labor demand is Hamermesh (1993). His 
survey of studies that estimate the effect of wages on employment concludes 
that the output-constant, long-run elasticity of labor demand (i) is bounded by 
zero and 1 .O for most firms, with a likely confidence interval from 0.15 to 0.75, 
and (ii) is larger among less skilled workers than more skilled ones. We might 
inflate these bounds a bit to reflect scale effects and additional opportunities 
for substitution at the market level of aggregation, and larger elasticities for 
the less skilled. If  applied to equation (l),  this range of estimates might yield 
a range of several hundred thousand jobs. 
But even Hamermeshs rather wide confidence interval is probably optimis- 
tic. Studies of inverse demand systems-where  factor supplies are allowed to 
affect wages-typically  find only small effects. For example, Welch (1979) 
and Berger (1989) find elasticities of wages with respect to cohort size that are 
smaller than 0.2. LaLonde and Tope1 (1991), Card (1990), and Hunt (1992) 
find negligible effects of increases in the supply of immigrants on the wages 
of other immigrants and of similarly skilled natives. The implication of these 
studies is that marketwide, own-price demand elasticities for less skilled labor 
are fairly large, vastly above Hamermesh’s upper bound of 0.75 for direct esti- 
mates. At the other extreme, recent studies of the impact of minimum wages 
in less skilled markets attempt to make the case that the own-price elasticity 
of demand for low-wage labor is virtually zero (Card and Krueger 1992). 
Unlike the literature on labor supply, most of the demand studies just cited 
did not have the goal of estimating a demand elasticity per se. Instead, they are 
case studies that apply a labor demand framework to a particular problem. 
They provide useful answers to the problem at hand-did  immigration have a 
discernible effect on natives’ wages?-but  they are wildly inconsistent with 
each other, at least within the context of a labor demand model. The results 
cannot be generalized in any obvious way. Indeed, the fact that we undertake 
so many case studies is evidence of our uncertainty about (a) the model itself 66  Robert Tope1 
when applied in any particular context and (b) the parameters of  the model, 
even when appropriately applied. The combination of these leaves me with an 
extraordinarily wide confidence interval for demand elasticities in low-wage 
markets. A value of 0.3 does not seem unreasonable, but neither does 1.3. 
2.2.4  Data Needs for Parametric Models 
My assessment of the state of our knowledge about supply and demand elas- 
ticities in the labor market is pessimistic, but I do not think excessively so. 
Even less is known about other important behavioral effects. How do skill dif- 
ferentials in wages affect human capital investment decisions? Does perfor- 
mance pay  improve work effort? How does geographic mobility respond to 
interarea wage differentials?  Theory and common sense tell us the sign of these 
effects, and perhaps some values that would be utterly unreasonable, but that 
is about all. 
What can be done to obtain better estimates of behavioral effects? In the 
absence of experimental data, the obvious answer is to study real-world con- 
ceptual experiments in  which the identifying assumptions of  econometric 
models are convincingly satisfied. There is nothing new in that statement. But 
the cause of our uncertainty about key parameters is that such conceptual ex- 
periments are few and far between, not that economists have ignored them 
when they occur. The identification problem is difficult enough in the case of 
descriptive models that estimate, say, the returns to schooling. It is much harder 
in behavioral models that try to isolate the adjustments of agents to differences 
or changes in market equilibria. Uncertainty about behavioral effects may be 
the nature of things. 
More data can only help if we believe that there are real-world experiments 
for which too little information is now collected. Most empirical economists 
can think of plausible examples where this is the case. Is it important to under- 
stand whether incentive pay affects employee performance, which is the foun- 
dation of agency literature on employment relations? Then we need to observe 
cases where performance is measurable and firms changed their compensation 
policies. Examples like this one are obvious. A long list could be drawn up. 
Beyond them, I cannot offer concrete proposals or an agenda for data collec- 
tion that will reduce our uncertainty about behavioral effects in  the labor 
market. 
2.3  Conclusions 
Empirical research in  labor economics has been remarkably successful in 
describing labor market outcomes. For the most part, this knowledge has been 
fueled by the availability of  large-scale microdata sets that are publicly col- 
lected or funded. These data have vastly improved our understanding of how 
labor markets work  and the magnitudes of  social problems, and they have 67  Analytical Needs and Empirical Knowledge in Labor Economics 
greatly influenced the direction of economic research (Stafford 1986). Use of 
these data also points to feasible areas where more information is needed, and 
where the payoffs in terms of hard empirical knowledge are likely to be large. 
I described above some areas that I think are important. 
Empirical research has been less successful in calibrating economic behav- 
ior. Despite substantial efforts to estimate behavioral responses, our confidence 
intervals for these effects remain embarrassingly large. For policy evaluations 
that depend on these effects, it is often the case that the state of our empirical 
knowledge  hardly  crosses the threshold  of being useful.  In part, this is the 
nature of the beast. Real-world conceptual experiments that allow us to isolate 
relevant parameters are rare, and even when they occur it is not clear that the 
results are easily generalizable to other contexts and problems. It is hard to be 
optimistic that progress will come quickly on these issues. 
There is irony in this. The power of economic analysis comes from its ability 
to model human behavior in a systematic way.  Economics has something to 
say about behavior, but empirical economics is a long way  from accurately 
measuring it. 
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Comment  Frank P.  Stafford 
Several years ago at a conference of this nature A1 Rees made a remark along 
the lines of the Mark Twain quote. He said that labor economics was different 
from other fields in economics and from the rest of the social sciences. Labor 
economists know what it is they don’t know. If anything, this remark has be- 
come more applicable in recent years. Labor economists have led the way  in 
published work addressing the issues of measurement and data quality. Some 
of this has been disheartening. In one sense we can say that we know what we 
don’t know, and every day we add to our knowledge! 
Based on numerous studies there is the sense that the gap between perceived 
ex ante data quality and actual data quality has often been large. For example, 
the research interest in fixed effects models has shown up the extent to which 
wage measures based on respondent reports of hours and earnings are subject 
to large doses of measurement error (Bjorklund 1989; Hamermesh 1989). On 
the other hand, some studies have  shown that external records from an em- 
ployer can be extremely useful (Stafford and Sundstrom 1996). Even if  such 
external records are not available, we can proceed as long as the character of 
the data errors is known. 
The main thesis in Topel’s paper is that data and estimation and the develop- 
ment of economic theory should be interactive. Theory shapes the questions to 
be addressed empirically, but theory is stimulated by observing puzzles, either 
in the data or in casual observation. Labor economics has become distinct from 
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other fields in economics by the extent to which the empirical side of the ledger 
is given attention, undue attention in the minds of some of  our colleagues in 
fields such as industrial organization or economic theory per se. Only in labor 
economics are studies that are “purely descriptive” deemed to be profession- 
ally respectable, or at least unlikely to bring on a revocation of tenure! In fact, 
however, much of the descriptive work is motivated by the discovery that facts 
implied by  prevailing theory and facts turned up empirically are often difficult 
to reconcile. 
A classic example of data leading theory has to be the apparent wage slow- 
down and decline in the per capita earning power or real wage in the United 
States during the past 25 years. Either our theories are bad or our data are bad, 
or both! Wages should not stall out when investment (broadly defined to in- 
clude human and physical components) increases, trade expands rapidly, and 
significant new information technology pervades the society! As pointed out 
in the paper  on  divergent trends  in  alternative real  wage series (Abraham, 
Spletzer, and Stewart, chap. 8 in this volume), a good part  of  the problem 
seems to be that hours of market work are not well measured either by em- 
ployer reports of hours paid for or by respondent reports of  hours of market 
work in household surveys. 
The latter problem of household survey estimates of market hours is under- 
scored by comparisons with data from time diaries. Quite an extensive set of 
methodological studies show that diaries provide unbiased estimates of market 
work and other activities and are designed by construction to “add up” to the 
constraint of 24 hours per day. It has long been known that time diaries show 
a stronger trend toward reduced hours of market work in postwar industrial 
economies, in comparison to such trends estimated from conventional hours 
reports by  respondents. This can be shown for the United  States and Japan 
over the period 1965-80 (Stafford and Duncan 1985). A recent methodological 
comparison suggests that for adult men in the United States, weekly hours of 
work beyond 40 from respondent reports are virtually all exaggeration (Rob- 
inson and Bostrom 1994). If  proper measures of real wage growth (based on 
hours estimates from diaries) were to show somewhat greater growth, there 
would be more credibility to our prevailing theories as well as an opportunity 
to support or refute the innovative new variants of growth theory. 
To what extent is it possible to use even ideally error-free data to test hypoth- 
eses and estimate theoretically relevant relationships? How often does nature 
give us the equivalent of experiments? These concerns have motivated the era 
of social experiments (Hausman and Wise 1985). The impact of  these experi- 
ments on the research community has been quite small, at least judging from 
the extent to which they led to published papers, even during the era when 
the data were collected (Manser, chap. 1 in this volume). Instead, the use of 
nonexperimental data has come to the fore with microdata sets, notably the 
NLS, PSID, and CPS, having a remarkably high share of the research publica- 
tions in labor economics. Further, the research uses of the NLS and the PSID 72  Robert Topel 
are branching out into related social sciences (in the area of intergenerational 
mobility, child development, and early human capital formation) and into mac- 
roeconomic areas (based on income dynamics and asset accumulation). 
Microdata sets have been applied in “natural experiments” across different 
market economies (Kim and Topel 1995; Blank 1994) and have turned up not 
so much clean tests of  the “experimental” variety but much deeper insight 
into the variety of  ways in which market economies and their related social 
institutions accomplish economic functions. On the experimental side, there 
have been some interesting “tests” too. The recent tax reform in Sweden has 
apparently had only small short-run effects on labor supply. Panel respondents 
were placed into three groups: substantially lower taxes, substantially higher 
taxes, and no significant change in taxes. Preliminary results indicate no sig- 
nificant differences in behavior between the lower tax and higher tax groups 
(Klevmarken 1994). Perhaps a difference  will emerge through time, or perhaps 
the prior tax reforms had already muted the incentive effects of tax changes in 
Sweden. In any event this is an interesting case to study since many of the tax 
changes can be regarded as income compensated. After-tax wage rates rose, 
but “fixed” taxes on fuel and other items were raised to preserve overall macro- 
economic budget balance. 
Before becoming too pessimistic about what can be learned, we should re- 
flect occasionally on our successes. Application of  microdata has had some 
dramatic successes both within labor economics and in other fields. The first 
big success story with microdata was in the area of  consumer behavior. The 
theories of the permanent income hypothesis and the life cycle hypothesis were 
tested, as well as the simple Keynesian consumption function. My impression 
is that the work in that area has been remarkably successful. In the area of the 
permanent income hypothesis, use of  microeconomic panel data established 
the robustness of both the short-run consumption function and the longer run 
function, including disaggregation of family income into various components 
(Holbrook and Stafford 1971). 
The life cycle consumption hypothesis has not been such an apparent suc- 
cess, but it is harder to test since it implies smoothing over a much longer time 
period. This longer time period gives rise to much more complex issues of 
income and asset uncertainty, information, and changing family and household 
composition through time. Work with the PSID has shown that liquidity con- 
straints lead younger workers to desire more hours of  work in light of a wage 
decline rather than fewer (Dau-Schmidt 1984). If  so, the life cycle consump- 
tion hypothesis should be merged with labor supply under uncertainty and 
could be useful in explaining the inability of wage changes to clear the labor 
market entirely when demand declines: if constrained  workers seek more hours 
(and recent data show how little most workers, even in preretirement years, 
have in the way of liquid assets), then when labor demand shifts inward, labor 
supply shifts outward, placing an extreme burden on wages as the sole clearing 
mechanism, particularly in light of our theories of labor contracting. 73  Analytical Needs and Empirical Knowledge in Labor Economics 
The discussion by Topel on the lack of clear results from the studies of labor 
supply elasticities is illuminating if  disheartening. To a range of theoretical 
concerns about the excessive simplicity of the modeling as it applies to individ- 
uals (who may  be working under a long-term arrangement) one must add a 
host of data problems. Progress seems possible if the right “experiment” comes 
along. One pointed to is the sharp fall in the wage of less skilled workers in 
the past two decades. There is some evidence from the CPS that these workers 
have  responded  by  increasing  their  hours  of  work  (Bosworth  and  Burtless 
1992). In  contrast, other evidence (Juhn, Topel, and Murphy  1991) suggests 
that these workers have responded by reducing their hours of work. 
It is anxiety creating to have well-known  empirical researchers reporting 
such different results. A closer look suggests that the differences likely stem, at 
least partly, from alternative conceptual approaches. In the Bosworth-Burtless 
paper, the analysis adjusts for cyclical unemployment and looks at (increasing) 
hours supplied as the wages of less skilled workers have declined through time. 
The implication is that income effects have induced more (desired) hours. The 
Juhn-Topel-Murphy  paper treats long-term shifts into unemployment and out 
of the  labor force as part of  labor supply and implies that hours of market 
work have declined via substitution effects. The matter here is heavily one of 
theoretical approach to analysis of the data rather than data gaps or problems. 
Other areas of  labor supply research are clouded by both  data problems and 
differences in conceptualization. 
If we define success by a better consensus concerning the empirical regulari- 
ties highlighted by theory, a leading candidate for the designation of “success” 
has to be the life cycle human capital theory. It seems to me that while this is 
not the whole wage story, the basic elements are supported and appear to be 
better supported the better the measures are. For example, virtually any disag- 
gregation of work history into work experience of different types of spells out 
of  the labor force “works”  in the sense that earnings variation  is better  ex- 
plained. The success of these partial equilibrium models may not carry over to 
studies that consider the overall labor market as a set of interconnected mar- 
kets. This demand side of the market and a topic discussed by Topel, internal 
labor markets,  will require that far better data be available on the employer 
side of the market, for one thing. 
Recent progress in merging establishment data with individual data (Abowd 
and Kramarz, chap. 10 in this volume) appears promising. On the other hand, 
“employment units” are inherently  more difficult to survey than  “household 
units.” Individuals can be followed, and they attach to new families and firms. 
Large firms change quite a lot, and small firms are always changing. It is also 
hard to know who is actually making decisions in a firm, so that verbal corrob- 
oration of the rationale for some critical observed behavior is not available to 
the extent it is in households. On the other hand, I draw a fairly strong conclu- 
sion from the results reported by Marilyn Manser (chap. 1 in this volume). The 
establishment of an interactive process to receive input from the larger research 74  Robert Topel 
community is important for success in the design and use of such a database. 
Large projects directed from  within government agencies without research 
community involvement and guidance from conceptual models are unlikely to 
contribute much to our knowledge. 
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